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FEATURE COMMENT: Rethinking The
World Bank’s Sanctions System
The World Bank is reviewing its system for suspending and debarring contractors (known formally
as the World Bank sanctions system). The system
is used to sanction contractors that have engaged
in fraud or corruption (and other enumerated bad
acts) related to Bank-financed projects. The World
Bank sanctions system proceeds in stages—investigation, review, sanctions and possible remedial
efforts—which appear unlikely to change, in any
fundamental way, under the current review. The
World Bank has, however, invited public comment
on the incremental changes which have been proposed.
As the discussion below reflects, although the
proposed reforms are potentially quite significant,
the Bank has not yet assessed its “first principles”—
its goals, and the costs and benefits of meeting those
goals. Nor has the Bank released the data necessary
for completing that assessment. After reviewing the
sanctions process, and identifying what appear to
be the Bank’s current goals in its sanctions system
(stemming reputational and fiduciary risks), the
discussion below recommends that the World Bank
defer finalizing any reforms until it concludes its
assessment of first principles, and has at hand all
the data necessary to assess the sanctions system
against those first principles.
How the World Bank reforms its sanctions
system is important, both to contractors working on World Bank projects and to the broader
developing world. The World Bank finances tens
4-135-092-7		

of billions of dollars in procurement every year,
across the globe, and its procurement guidelines—and its sanctions system—offer important
models for nations and institutions building new
systems to fight corruption in procurement. See,
e.g., UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Guidebook on
Anti-Corruption in Public Procurement and the
Management of Public Finances: Good Practices in
Ensuring Compliance with Article 9 of the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (2013);
Rose-Ackerman, “International Actors and the
Promises and Pitfalls of Anti-Corruption Reform,”
34 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 447 (2013).
Understanding the World Bank’s Sanctions System—The sanctions system at the World
Bank, see “World Bank Sanctions Procedures”
(April 15, 2013), available at go.worldbank.org/
CVUUIS7HZ0; Green, International Government
Contract Law § 5:20 (West 2013), was shaped in
part by recommendations from former U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh. See, e.g.,
Fariello and Daly, “Coordinating the Fight Against
Corruption Among MDBs: The Past, Present, and
Future of Sanctions,” 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.
253, 258 (2013). And, as the table below reflects, the
World Bank system in many ways resembles the
U.S. federal system. See, e.g., Priess, “Questionable
Assumptions: The Case for Updating the Suspension and Debarment Regimes at the Multilateral
Development Banks,” 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.
271, 272–73 (2013).
As with the U.S. federal system, see Federal Acquisition Regulation subpt. 9.4, 48 CFR subpt. 9.4,
the World Bank sanctions process is self-contained
and stands apart from any criminal or civil proceedings. See generally Dubois, “Domestic and International Administrative Tools to Combat Fraud
and Corruption: A Comparison of US Suspension
and Debarment with the World Bank’s Sanctions
System,” 2012 U. Chi. Legal Forum 195; Williams,
“The Debarment of Corrupt Contractors from World
Bank-Financed Contracts,” 36 Pub. Cont. L.J. 277
(2007). The World Bank system, like the U.S. sys-
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tem, affords due process protections to contractors
and individuals under review, see, e.g., de Chazournes
and Fromageau, “Balancing the Scales: The World
Bank Sanctions Process and Access to Remedies,” 23
Eur. J. Int’l L. 963 (2012), and results in a “general”
bar—it is not a contract-by-contract exclusion system.
Unlike the U.S. federal system, however, the
World Bank sanctions system is highly adjudicative. See, e.g., World Bank, “Sanctions System at

Comparing
Debarment Systems

U.S. Federal Procurement

World Bank

Causes of Debarment

Broadly defined (for discretionary,
i.e., non-“statutory” debarments)

Per Guidelines: a corrupt, fraudulent,
coercive, collusive or obstructive practice

Referral and Sources of
Evidence

Any source; any investigation

Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) investigation;
redacted reports provided to third parties

Temporary Suspension

Allowed, e.g., notice of proposed
debarment

Allowed, if sufficient proof

Standards for Debarment

Preponderance; then contractor must
show responsible (qualified)

Preponderance, ultimately by Sanctions
Board

Hearing

Yes

Yes, before Sanctions Board

Resolutions (range)

Debarment to Administrative
Agreement

Debarment to Settlement (reviewed)

Cross-Debarment

All federal agencies

All multilateral development banks

Judicial Review

Yes

No

Although federal suspension and debarment
officials retain substantial discretion (at least in
matters which are not subject to mandatory statutory debarment), their World Bank counterparts
serve in a role much more like an administrative
judge’s. Cf. Dubois and Nowlan, “Global Administrative Law and the Legitimacy of Sanctions Regimes
in International Law,” 36 Yale J. Int’l L. Online 15
(2010) (arguing that World Bank sanctions system
works best if it incorporates principles of global
administrative law).
As the accompanying diagram (Figure 1) explains,
the World Bank suspension and debarment officials
receive reports from the investigators in the World
Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency (INT), and, based
upon the available record, the suspension and debarment officials must recommend an appropriate sanction, subject to review by the Sanctions Board. See,
e.g., Dubois, “The Litigator’s Role in the World Bank’s
Fight Against Fraud and Corruption,” 39 Litigation
38 (2013).
2

the World Bank” (“[T]he World Bank’s sanctions
system consists of a two-tier adjudicative process, with a first level of review carried out by the
Bank’s Suspension and Debarment Officer (SDO) ...
and, for contested cases, a second level of review by the World Bank Group Sanctions Board,
an independent body with a majority of external members.”), available at go.worldbank.org/
WICZWZY0E0.

Unlike their counterparts in the U.S. Government, World Bank suspension and debarment officials may not engage in open-ended discussions
regarding present responsibility with contractors
facing potential debarment. See, e.g., Nadler, Ware
and Mohr, Feature Comment, “New Developments
In The World Bank’s Sanctions Regime,” 54 GC ¶
157 (noting World Bank suspension and debarment
officials’ limited role in settlements). Instead, the
World Bank sanctions system calls for the Bank’s
suspension and debarment official to make a careful decision on the record, calibrating the presented
evidence against the narrowly defined categories
of bad acts which can trigger debarment. See, e.g.,
Brown, Bribery in International Commerce § 7:28
(West 2013). As noted, that decision, in turn, can be
appealed to the Bank’s Sanctions Board.
Because of these subtle but critical differences
between the two systems, while the U.S. system is
focused on assessing the present responsibility of
the vendor, see, e.g., FAR 9.402, 48 CFR § 9.402—
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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Figure 1 -- Source: World Bank
whether the vendor has the necessary systems and
integrity to perform suitably—the World Bank’s
sanctions system seems to be geared more toward
reducing fiduciary risk (the risk that Bank funds
will be misdirected) and reputational risk (the loss
of legitimacy caused by corruption), by punishing and deterring certain bad acts. Cf., e.g., World
Bank, “History of Sanctions Reform,” available
at go.worldbank.org/G0YL1VLJM0 (World Bank
“Group faced fiduciary and reputational risks when
it had credible evidence that a firm or individual
had engaged in fraud and corruption and the firm
or individual remained eligible to bid on Bank
Group-financed projects”).
The Bank’s hierarchical process, with its distinct steps and careful checks and balances, leaves
individual Bank officials without the discretion (or
authority) to assess the special performance risks
(or opportunities) which a vendor may present. The
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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World Bank system assumes that sanctions can and
should be imposed for specific bad acts. Nothing in
the Bank system suggests, for example, that the
suspension and debarment officials would have the
discretion to ignore a sanctionable act if doing so
would keep a vital (but risky) contractor available
for future competitions. Cf., e.g., Matjan, “The SelfCleaning Dilemma: Reconciling Competing Objectives
of Procurement Processes,” 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.
291 (2013) (discussing limited bases for reduction in
World Bank sanctions).
There is a logic to this focus, because the Bank
(in its role as lender) does not actually administer
contracts; it is a bank, not a procuring agency, and it
has different stakeholders and different concerns. Cf.
Canni, “Debarment Is No Longer Private World Bank
Business: An Examination of the Bank’s Distinct
Debarment Procedures Used for Corporate Procurements and Financed Projects,” 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 147
3
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(2010) (discussing World Bank debarment system for
its own “corporate” purchases).
The U.S. system, in contrast, is much more flexible. In the U.S. federal system, the debarment decision is, at its heart, a business decision, centered
around performance risk and weighing many factors,
including (as a practical matter) potential effects on
future competitions. See, e.g., Manuel, “Debarment
and Suspension of Government Contractors: An
Overview of the Law Including Recently Enacted
and Proposed Amendments” 9 (Cong. Res. Serv. 2012)
(“Because [under the U.S. federal system] the public
interest encompasses both safeguarding public funds
by excluding contractors who may be nonresponsible
and not excluding contractors who are fundamentally responsible and could otherwise compete for
government contracts, agency officials could find
that contractors who engaged in exclusion-worthy
conduct should not be excluded, particularly if they
appear unlikely to engage in similar conduct in the
future.” (footnotes excluded)); cf. Fariello and Daly,
supra, at 259 (“Through multiple reforms over the
years, the Bank has moved fairly decisively away
from its original conception of sanctions as a purely
business decision towards a rule of law approach.”).
These are generalizations, of course, and neither
system is “pure”: World Bank officials do consider
contractors’ performance risk in certain contexts, and
U.S. officials can, at times, debar contractors largely
for reasons of reputational risk. In the main, though,
the two systems are structured around radically different goals. But taken together, the parallel systems
highlight the three key issues that arise when corruption taints public procurement: the public purchaser
loses legitimacy (reputational risk), precious public
funds are diverted (fiduciary risk), and the purchaser
loses best value (performance risk, which can be
bundled into fiduciary risk, but here is addressed as
a distinct risk at the procuring agency level).
Sanctions System Review and Issues—
Against this backdrop, the World Bank has undertaken a new review of its sanctions system. See World
Bank, “Review of the World Bank Group Sanctions
System: Consultation Plan” (Sept. 5, 2013), available at consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/
sanctions-reviews; Bruce Zagaris, “World Bank Conducts Stock-Taking of Its Sanctions System,” 29 Int’l
Enforcement L. Rep. ¶ 354 (Sept. 2013). The World
Bank sanctions system has been reformed a number
of times before, and this latest review is to build on
4
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those earlier reforms. See, e.g., Nadler and Ware,
Feature Comment, “The World Bank Implements New
Sanctions Procedures,” 53 GC ¶ 41.
To frame the review, the World Bank undertook
internal consultations, and a preliminary report on
the initial findings was discussed with the Bank’s
Audit Committee on March 22, 2013, in executive
session. The preliminary report (which reportedly is
several hundred pages long, including attachments)
has not been released to the public; instead, a summary (an “initiating discussion brief ”) has been
posted at the consultation website cited above.
The review is to proceed in two phases. During
phase I, the Bank is assessing how various reforms
have been implemented since the last round of reform
in 2007, the impact of the sanctions regime on Bank
operations, and the legal adequacy of the current system “in light of current developments in national and
international law.” “Review of the World Bank Group
Sanctions System,” supra. In phase II, the Bank
will “address the larger, first-principles issues of the
overall efficiency and effectiveness of the system—i.e.,
whether the system as a whole is meeting its objectives of excluding corrupt actors and deterring fraud
and corruption in World Bank Group operations, at an
appropriate cost to the World Bank Group.” Id.
Issue: Defining First Principles: Because the Bank
has deferred consideration of first principles until
phase II of the project (which may not occur until
2014), it has not identified the core principles and
purpose of the sanctions regime. As the discussion
above reflects, as currently structured, the Bank’s
sanctions system focuses first on fiduciary and reputational risk, and does not focus on the performance
risk that client governments may face from corrupt or
incompetent contractors. Many of the reforms being
considered (some of which are discussed below) would
be easier to assess if the Bank, as a threshold matter,
identified the core goals under the current system,
and framed how it will assess the costs and benefits
of addressing those goals.
Issue: Making Data Available to Public: Regardless of the direction chosen—for example, the Bank
may opt to keep its focus on reputational and fiduciary risks, or it may decide to take a more granular
approach to performance risk—those first principles
should be assessed against a more complete evidentiary base. The initiating discussion brief (the summary report released by the Bank) is only 18 pages
long, and it would be impossible to assess from that
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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brief report whether the Bank is succeeding in meeting its core goals.
Thus, for example, while the initiating discussion
brief notes on page 8 that “over 86% of sanctions cases
have involved fraudulent practices, of which the vast
majority has involved forgery or other forms of misrepresentation in bidding documents,” one cannot discern
from the limited data whether these misrepresentations
in bidding actually do point to risks in performance.
By the same token, without release of the data
gathered to date, one cannot determine whether further research is needed to assess possible alternative
paths. It may, for example, be practically impossible
for the Bank to assess the day-to-day performance
risks that contractors pose during administration of
Bank-financed projects—but without release of the
preliminary data, there is no way to assess that.
Issue: Suspensions Pending Investigations: If the
Bank broadly assesses first principles—if it concludes,
for example, that although the sanctions system is focused on reputational and fiduciary risks, the system
must also be mindful of costs to borrowers—it will
be better equipped to assess some of the procedural
adjustments that it has already proposed.
In the summary report, the Bank proposed, for
example, that there should be more “early temporary
suspensions” (ETSs) pending INT investigations,
which can take several years. This proposal may go
even farther: one commenter from the Freshfields law
firm noted that “there is also a suggestion to relax the
standard to obtain an ETS by, for example, allowing
an ETS to issue on the mere commencement of an
INT investigation.” See also Independent Advisory
Board (IAB), 2012 Annual Report, at 10 (February
2013) (board report, covering work of INT, raised
possibility of temporary suspensions based upon
probable cause alone, at outset of investigation, to
mitigate risks), available at siteresources.worldbank.
org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1244163232994/
IAB-2012AnnualReport.pdf.
The proposed early suspensions could severely
impact future competitions on Bank-financed projects.
However, until the Bank clarifies its core principles
(i.e., until it decides whether it is also responsible
for ensuring adequate competition in its borrowers’
public procurement markets, and so should assess
the competitive impacts of any early temporary
suspensions), the Bank cannot fairly assess whether
the proposed changes to the sanctions process are in
keeping with its goals.
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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Issue: Suspensions Pending Settlement: The
Bank’s summary report suggests on page 13 that
consideration should be given to requiring firms
under investigation to suspend further contracting (through a “voluntary undertaking or ETS”)
as a condition to entering into “major settlement
negotiations.” If the Bank’s core goal is to protect
its reputation, this approach is entirely logical.
Although it would discourage firms from entering
into settlement negotiations, this approach would
minimize any risks of new scandals emerging during those negotiations. If, however, the Bank instead
concludes that encouraging settlement negotiations
and maintaining robust competition are also core
goals, for doing so will reduce performance risks
for borrower nations in the long run, the Bank may
conclude that forcing these “voluntary” suspensions
is not a worthwhile reform.
Issue: Allowing Investigators to Appeal Decisions by the Suspension and Debarment Officer:
The Bank’s summary report suggests on page 16
that INT should be allowed to appeal decisions by
the Bank’s suspension and debarment officers to
the Sanctions Board—in other words, that the investigators should be allowed to appeal a decision
by the “gatekeeper” (the suspension and debarment
officer) not to recommend a sanction. Once the Bank
enunciates its first principles, it is difficult to see
how any commonly recognized goal could be met by
this suggestion. Even if the core goal of the sanctions system is limited to a reduction in fiduciary
and reputational risks, the summary report cites
no evidence that the suspension and debarment
officers have erroneously passed on cases in which
those risks have been presented. And if the goals
are more broadly defined to include efficiency in the
process, there seems little logic in creating broad
new rights of appeal in the Bank’s investigative
arm.
Issue: Cross-Debarment: The Bank’s summary
report also suggests “permitting the World Bank
to refer to third-party debarments as a basis for
ineligibility”—to open the door, in other words,
to broader use of cross-debarment, so that when
another nation or institution debars a contractor,
the Bank will follow suit. While cross-debarment
is facially appealing, discussions in the procurement community (including a public colloquium at
the George Washington University Law School on
October 22) suggest that summary cross-debarment
5
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could be deeply disruptive, and might well raise
issues of due process and proportionality. See generally Yukins, “Cross-Debarment: A Stakeholder
Analysis,” 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 219 (2013),
available at ssrn.com/abstract=2316252; Priess,
“Anti-Corruption Internationally: Challenges in
Procurement Markets Abroad—Part III: Complexity
and Divergence: Procurement Sanctions for Corruption—A Comparative Perspective,” 2013 Gov. Contr.
Year in Rev. Briefs 5 (February 2013); cf. Hostetler,
Note, “Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corporate Corruption on World Bank-Funded Infrastructure Projects,” 14 Yale Hum. Rights & Dev. L.J. 231
(2011) (arguing World Bank investigation should
trigger anticorruption proceedings in borrower
nation). If the Bank concludes that its goal is not
simply to eliminate reputational risk (a goal which
could be met by summary cross-debarment), but
rather more broadly to enhance performance at the
project level, it may decide to take a more cautious
approach to cross-debarment.
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Conclusion—As the discussion above reflects,
while the World Bank’s review of its sanctions system is very welcome, the Bank may wish to defer
any conclusions regarding appropriate reforms until
it has had an opportunity to define and assess first
principles in its sanctions system, and has more data
at hand to weigh the costs and benefits of proposed
reforms.

F
This Feature Comment was written for The Government Contractor by Christopher R. Yukins.
Professor Yukins (cyukins@law.gwu.edu) is the
Lynn David Research Professor in Government
Procurement Law, and co-director of the Government Procurement Law Program, at The
George Washington University Law School in
Washington, D.C. He is also counsel to the law
firm of Arnold & Porter LLP. This article, which
reflects only the personal views of the author, is
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